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This thesis proposes a novel algorithm to mine popular paths in a 
system, while the privacy of individual user is preserved. The idea of the 
proposed algorithm is to figure out what information is no use for the 
identification of popular paths, and this information, which is usually more 
private, is not revealed in order to preserve privacy. In order to offset the 
decreased accuracy due to privacy protection, we performed analysis for 
the algorithm and we found a way to tune the parameters so that the 
accuracy can be increased. In this way, the accuracy of the algorithm is 
much higher than that of choosing limited information to reveal randomly, 
though the same level of privacy is preserved. 
The proposed algorithm can be applied to a smart card system. A 
popular path in the smart card system is known as a popular purchase 
sequence, which is a common purchase subsequence that followed by a 
number of customers. Popular purchase sequences contain information, 
such as purchase orders of customers, which is difficult to be discovered 
by traditional algorithms like the frequent itemset algorithm. Popular 
purchase sequences can be used to investigate the purchase behaviors of 
the customers, which are very useful for marketing and sales strategy 
purposes. Therefore, we apply our proposed algorithm to the smart card 
system. 
i 
The proposed algorithm can also be applied to a traffic monitoring 
system. In a transportation system, a popular (navigation) path refers to 
one of the most frequently used routes between any two points in a road 
map. This application is motivated by the inefficiency of existing traffic 
monitoring system. A traditional traffic monitoring system only counts the 
number of vehicles that pass through a road segment. Identifying popular 
paths from such database is inaccurate as the path obtained by connecting 
adjacent popular road segments may not be a popular path. Another 
traditional algorithm may be used is the frequent itemset algorithm. 
However, when the road map contains a loop, the counting of a path that is 
connected by the path enters the loop and the path leaves the loop is 
incorrect. It is because an itemset does not record the order of items. 
Therefore, we need an algorithm that is able to identify popular paths 
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In data mining, intuitively, we lose accuracy when privacy has to be 
preserved. It is because the mining process is based on limited information 
only. However, in some cases, it is possible to retain the statistical 
behaviors of the original information within the limited information. In 
this way, the accuracy can be retained, while the privacy is preserved by 
the actual difference between the original information and the limited 
information. An example is the mining of popular paths. 
1.1 Problem statement 
Popular paths (or popular sequences, depending on the problem 
domain) usually contain important information in different problem 
domains and so they are worth to be identified. In general, a popular path 
indicates a common sequential pattern followed by a number of 
individuals. Suppose there are n items ( ? i ， t h e y can be possessed 
by the individuals and different individuals can possess the same item. 
Each individual may possess a sequence of items, say <ri, h, ..., tr>. A 
subsequence of the above sequence is fa+1，…，tb>’ where \ <a<b<r. 
When there are many individuals contain the same subsequence of items, 
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this subsequence is regarded as a popular path. Therefore, a popular path 
with length k is also a sequence of items and can be written as <t\, h,..., 
tk>. Our objective is to identify the popular paths. 
The meanings of an item and a popular path depend on the 
applications. In this thesis, we investigate two applications: a smart card 
system and a transportation system. In a smart card system, an item is a 
product/service that can be purchased by the customers and a popular path 
is a common purchase behavior that followed by a number of customers. 
In a transportation system, an item is a road segment in a road map and a 
popular path is one of the most frequently used routes between any two 
points in the road map. 
Mining popular paths is simple if the data miner can access all the 
relevant information of the individuals. However, it is not possible if 
privacy has to be preserved. Consider a case that no data holders contain 
all the individuals' information, but the individuals contain their own 
information instead. In this way, the data miner has to collect the 
information from the individuals separately. However, individuals will not 
reveal their information to the data miner if they think that their privacy is 
not protected and they may not trust the data miner. Therefore, in this 
thesis, we consider the above case and assume that the data miner is 
semi-honest, which means it strictly follows the given algorithms, but it 
may mine extra information about certain individual from the final 
database and all the intermediate results. In other words, we assume that 
the data miner is honest but curious. 
In order to preserve privacy, our approach is to limit the amount of 
revealed information of the individual and not revealing his identity. That 
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means each individual only reveals partial information anonymously. 
Suppose the information owned by each individual is a sequence of items 
<t\, t2, .••，tr> (we call it a complete sequence), then the revealed partial 
information is a subsequence of the complete sequence, i.e. <ta, ,a+i，...， 
tb>, where \ < a < b < r . A trivial solution to choose the revealed 
information is to select a random subsequence of the complete sequence. 
However, the accuracy is not good since the information not revealed may 
be crucial to identify the popular paths, and the amount unrevealed crucial 
information is not small. Therefore, there is a need to find a way to mine 
popular paths accurately, while the privacy of the individuals is preserved. 
We found that it is possible to estimate what information is crucial to 
identify the popular paths, and it is the key idea of our proposed algorithm, 
Popular Items Selection Algorithm (PISA). We call the information that is 
crucial to identify the popular paths as crucial information. We observe 
that the record of a popular item is crucial information, where a popular 
item is an item that contained by the complete sequences of many 
individuals. It is because we have proved that all the items in popular 
paths are popular items. Therefore, by PISA, the revealed information 
only consists of popular items. The information for popular items is 
usually publicly available or can be obtained easily, and no privacy issue 
is involved by collecting it. For example, in a smart card system, a popular 
item refers to the product that purchased by many customers; in a 
transportation system, a popular item refers to the road segment that 
passed through by many vehicles. 
By PISA, the amount of crucial information collected by the data 
miner is increased. In other words, the data miner is able to collect and 
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count the subsequences that are more likely to be subsequences of popular 
paths. Therefore, the accuracy of identifying popular paths is increased. 
On the side of the individuals, since non-popular items are owned by 
fewer individuals, so they are usually more private and the individuals feel 
that their privacy is preserved if they are not revealed. 
In addition, we perform analysis in PISA and we figure out how to 
further improve the accuracy. The improvement is done by first estimating 
the probability that the popular items cannot be revealed due to reaching 
the maximum amount of revealed information. Then, we adjust the 
threshold value for determining which path is a popular path according to 
this probability. In this way, the accuracy is further increased. We perform 
analysis and simulations to show the high accuracy of PISA. 
1.2 Major contributions 
First, we suggest using popular paths to represent the information that 
we are going to mine. Second, we propose a novel algorithm (PISA) that 
can mine popular paths accurately and preserve the privacy of individual 
users. Third, we perform analysis of the algorithm and further improve its 
accuracy. Lastly, we demonstrate that the algorithm can be applied to a 
smart card system and a transportation system, and we model the smart 
card system by a graph so that we can mine purchase time information and 
choose the information that we are going to mine. 
1.3 Thesis organization 
We think that it is easier for readers to understand the proposed 
algorithm by considering a concrete and traditional case, mining 
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customers' behavior. So, we first present and discuss the proposed 
algorithm by considering a smart card system in Chapter 2. Then, we 
demonstrate how to apply the proposed algorithm into a transportation 
system in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4，we describe the enhanced features that 
can be added when the algorithm is actually applied into a smart card 
system. Finally, the conclusion is presented in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2 
Smart Card System 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce our proposed algorithm 
by considering the popular path identification problem in a smart card 
system. This chapter is organized as follows. An introduction is given in 
Chapter 2.1. Then, the related work in this problem domain is presented in 
Chapter 2.2. After that, the model is defined in Chapter 2.3 and the 
algorithms are presented in Chapter 2.4. In Chapter 2.5, we analyze the 




Mining popular purchase behaviors, which may contain temporal 
information, from a smart card system can obtain important knowledge for 
planning business strategy. Smart card systems, like the octopus card 
system in Hong Kong, have been widely used as electronic money for 
almost all public transport and making payment at various stores, 
restaurants, car parks etc. Each smart card has a built-in microchip, which 
can store and process data. Table 1 shows an example of a sequence of 
records stored in a smart card. 
Date Time Journey 
17-01-2006 18:30 Bus route A 
17-01-2006 20:30 Shop B 
17-01-2006 21:00 Bus route C 
18-01-2006 08:15 Bus route D 
Table 1: An example of a sequence of purchase records 
The sequence of records stored in a smart card system is different 
from transaction records in the traditional association rule mining [1-5] in 
the sense that it contains temporal information. The transaction records in 
association rule mining only store the information about which products 
are purchased, while the sequence of records in a smart card also stores the 
purchase order. Therefore, the sequence of records in a smart card contains 
richer information and thus more knowledge can be mined. For example, 
if many customers follow the purchase order described in Table 1，we can 
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deduce that placing an advertisement of shop B at bus route A is more 
effective than placing it at minibus route C or bus route D. However, such 
information cannot be deduced from the transaction records in association 
rule mining. 
Table 2 shows the purchase sequences of nine customers. In this 
example, six items (A to F) are monitored. The first column shows the 
customer IDs, which are used for illustration propose only, they are not 
needed during the data mining process. The number in each entry between 
columns two to seven represents the purchase orders of the customers. The 
last column shows the purchase sequences of the corresponding customer. 
For example, the first record is extracted from Table 1. The purchase order 
is A, B, C, and then D, thus the purchase sequence is ''ABCD". 
From the last column of Table 2, we can observe that " A B C is a 
common purchase subsequence of the purchase sequences of five 
customers (1’ 2，3, 4，and 7). Suppose we define that a popular purchase 
sequence is a common purchase subsequence that followed by at least five 
customers (or we say that the threshold for popular purchase sequences is 
five), then " A B C is a popular purchase sequence. If the threshold is 
lowered to two, then “DA5C" and “FD” are also popular purchase 
sequences. 
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Bus Bus Bus 
Shop Shop Shop Purchase 
Customer route route route 
B E F sequence 
A C D 
1 1 2 3 4 - - ABCD 
2 1 2 3 - - - ABC 
3 2 3 4 - - 1 FABC 
4 3 4 5 2 - 1 FDABC 
5 1 2 - - - BC 
7 2 3 4 1 - - DABC 
8 1 - - 3 2 - AED 
9 1 2 4 - 3 BCFD 
Table 2. The purchase sequences of nine customers 
Popular purchase sequences cannot be identified by using the 
traditional data mining algorithms such as frequent itemset algorithms 
[6-9]. Consider Table 3，four customers (1，2, 3，and 5) follow the 
purchase sequence ‘‘ABCDE" and three customers (4’ 6，and 8) follow the 
purchase sequence “ABE". If the threshold for popular purchase sequences 
is five, then “ABE" is identified as a popular purchase sequence by the 
frequent itemset algorithms, since "ABE" is a subset of “ABCDE". 
However, “ABE" is not a popular purchase sequence since it is only 
followed by three customers. Therefore, we cannot use frequent itemset 
algorithms to identify popular purchase sequences. 
Customer Purchase sequence Customer Purchase sequence 
1 ABCDE 5 CABCDE 
2 ABCDEF 6 ABEG 
3 ABCDEG 7 ADE 
4 ABEF 8 CABEA 
Table 3. The purchase sequences of eight customers 
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Privacy is another important issue in the smart card system. 
Therefore, a data mining algorithm that fails to preserve privacy is not 
applicable to the system. Solving the popular purchase sequence problem 
is trivial if we do not need to preserve privacy. For example, the system 
can record the customer IDs when they make purchases, so that the 
complete purchase sequence of each customer can be obtained and thus 
popular purchase sequences can be identified. However, recording the 
customer ID is an invasion of privacy. Alternatively, instead of recording 
the customer IDs, the smart cards can reveal the complete purchase 
sequence to the data mining system periodically. However, privacy is still 
not preserved since someone may be able to guess the identity of the 
customer if his/her complete purchase sequence is revealed. Although 
many frequent itemset algorithms and association rule mining algorithms 
are focusing on privacy preserving [10-16], they cannot be used since they 
cannot identify popular purchase sequences. 
Therefore, we propose a novel algorithm that can identify popular 
purchase sequences with privacy protection. In order to preserve privacy, 
the identification of individual customers is not recorded and the smart 
card only reveals partial information. Revealing partial information 
increases the difficulty in identifying popular purchase sequences. Hence, 
besides preserving privacy, another objective of the algorithm is to 
maintain high accuracy of identifying popular purchase sequences. 
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2.2 Related Work 
In this section, we describe the research works related to mining 
popular paths in a smart card system, i.e. mining purchase behaviors of 
customers, which is a classic problem in the field of data mining. This 
section is divided into three parts. In the first part, we give a brief 
literature review of the research works related to mining customer 
behaviors. In the second part, we focus on the related work in privacy 
preserving data mining. In the last part, we review the different definitions 
of privacy. 
2.2.1 Mining Customer Behaviors 
By discovering association rules in a transaction database [1-5], we 
can mine the purchase behaviors of customers. An example of an 
association rule is 90% of the customers that purchase product A and 
product B also purchase product C, where 90% is the confidence factor. 
According to [1], finding all frequent itemsets in the transaction database 
is a sub-problem of association rules mining. There are many works 
focusing on finding frequent itemsets, such as [6-9]. The confidence factor 
is still an unknown if we find frequent itemsets only. However, it may be 
enough already, depending on the application. 
Another way to discover customer behaviors is to mine sequential 
patterns [20-22]. A sequence is an ordered list of itemsets. These works are 
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closely related to our problem since a path is just a sequence. However, 
these works have not considered the privacy issue yet. 
2.2.2 Privacy Preserving Data Mining 
In recent years, many papers about privacy preserving data mining 
are presented, some of them focus on privacy preserving in association 
rule mining. [10-16]. In general, the privacy is preserved by hiding 
sensitive association rules, which are the rules that would expose sensitive 
entries. 
There are also other types of privacy preserving. In general, there are 
two types. The first type is focused on privacy of individuals; the 
individual information is randomized while the randomization is 
compensated at the aggregate level. In [18], the authors suggest 
substituting an individual value x by x + g(mod 1001) with 50% 
probability, or a uniformly random number otherwise, where e is chosen 
uniformly at random between -100 and 100 inclusively. After the 
substitution, only the new value of x is revealed. In [16], the authors 
suggest that each datum has 1-p chance to be flipped. In [23，24], the 
authors first proposed the strategy “众-anonymity”. Privacy is preserved by 
assuring the database consists of at least k entries that hold the same value 
for the quasi-identifier, where the quasi-identifier is a set of attributes in 
combination that is able to identify an individual with high probability. 
After that, a number of papers that are using this strategy [25-28] have 
been published. 
The second type is focused on secure multi-party computation 
approach, which means protecting individual records so that this 
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information is not revealed to other databases when joint data mining of 
more than one database is performed. In [17], it considers a database T, 
with some protected entries, which are denoted as direct privacy set P. In 
order to preserve privacy, the authors suggest blanking out P as well as 
derived privacy set K, where the set K contains the entries corresponding 
to the adversary rules that can guess the direct privacy set. The revealed 
database is {T-P-K). In [19], the authors suggest using sanitizing algorithm 
to remove some information, such as decreasing the support, before 
revealing the database. 
2.2.3 Definitions of Privacy 
Privacy is an abstract concept. In the literature, there are several 
definitions of privacy, often depending on the situation. In [17, 19], a 
privacy breach is defined as the reveal of sensitive entries or sensitive 
association rules. In [16], a privacy breach is defined as a high probability 
for the distorted entries of individuals to be reconstructed by the data 
miner. In [18], a privacy breach is defined as a high probability for a data 
miner to know a certain property of the private information of an 
individual. In [27], a privacy breach is defined as the reveal of the identity 
of the sender or the receiver of a particular message. 
After /:-anonymity is proposed in [23, 24], a number of papers follow 
its definition of privacy: a database is private if others can only narrow 
down the search for the owner of any entry into at least k suspects. 
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2.3 Model 
Each smart card records the purchase record when its cardholder 
purchases a product/service. In our model, we define an item to be a 
product/service. It is formally defined as follows: 
Definition 1 (Item) An item is a product/service purchased by the 
customers. We denote the set of items as T and an item as t, where t e T. 
As the smart card records the purchase records continuously when the 
customer makes more purchases, a purchase sequence is stored in the 
smart card. The purchase sequence is formally defined as follows: 
Definition 2 (Purchase sequence) A purchase sequence S with length 
k\sa sequence of items <t\, ti,...,“〉. 
The purchase sequence is the complete purchase history of a 
customer, in other words it contains complete information. However, when 
we need to preserve privacy, partial information is revealed instead of 
complete information. A subsequence of the purchase sequence contains 
partial information of the complete purchase history. It is formally defined 
as follows: 
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Definition 3 (Subsequence) Let A = <au . . . ， a n d B = <bu 
Z?2, ...，b„i> be two purchase sequences. 5 is a subsequence of A, denoted 
as 5 c A iff Z?! = Ui, b2=ai+\, ...，b,n= «/+,„ where 1 < / < n-m+1. Therefore, 
the subsequence mentioned in this paper is contiguous. 
A purchase subsequence may appear in more than one purchase 
sequence. We define the actual count of a purchase subsequence as 
follows: 
Definition 4 (Actual count) Let 5 be a purchase sequence. The number 
of purchase sequences that contain 5 as a purchase subsequence is the 
actual count of S, which is denoted as Sac, 
When the actual count of a purchase sequence is no less than a 
threshold, it is regarded as a popular purchase sequence (or a popular path). 
However, the popular purchase sequence may be too short to be useful if 
there is no lower bound limit on the length. Therefore, we use one more 
criterion minlen (minimum length) to define a popular purchase sequence, 
so that the length of the identified popular purchase sequence should be no 
shorter than minlen. The popular purchase sequence is formally defined as 
follows: 
Definition 5 (Popular purchase sequence) Given a set of purchase 
sequences D and a popular purchase sequence threshold tpps, a sequence S 
with length kis a. popular purchase sequence iff k > minlen and it occurs as 
a subsequence in all sequences in D for at least tpps times, i.e. |{P G D s.t. S 
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c P}| > tpps and Sac ^  tpps. Note that minlen > 1. 
Usually, data miners are interested in maximal popular purchase 
sequences, where these sequences are not subsequences of any other 
popular purchase sequences. 
The objective of our proposed algorithm is to identify popular 
purchase sequences. If we do not need to preserve privacy, all the purchase 
sequences can be obtained from the smart card system and thus the 
solution is trivial. However, if privacy is preserved, we cannot obtain all 
the purchase sequences but only the subsequences, thus the difficulty of 
the problem increases. Therefore, we propose our algorithm to identify 




In this section, we first introduce the baseline algorithm that can 
identify popular purchase sequences without preserving privacy. After that, 
we introduce another algorithm (RSSA) that can solve the same problem 
with privacy protection. However, we found that its accuracy is not good. 
Therefore, finally, we propose our novel algorithm (PISA), which 
preserves privacy and achieves good accuracy. 
2.4.1 Baseline Algorithm 
From Definition 5，a popular purchase sequence is a sequence that 
occurs as a subsequence in all the purchase sequences for at least tpps times. 
Therefore, when the smart card reveals the purchase sequence to the data 
mining system, the system generates all the possible subsequences for the 
purchase sequence and stores them into a database called Generated 
Subsequence Table (GST). This process is called the Subsequence 
Generation Algorithm (SGA). 
Subsequence Generation Algorithm (purchase sequence S) 
1. Generate all the possible contiguous subsequences of S with 
length > minlen 
2. For each generated subsequence G generated in step 1 
If G exists in the GST 
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G(. = Gr + 1, where Gc is the count of G in GST 
Else 
A new entry G is created with Gc= I 
Algorithm 1: Subsequence Generation Algorithm (SGA) 
For example, if the purchase sequence is <ti, h, h, U, ts> and minlen 
is equal to 3，then there are 6 generated subsequences, they are <t\, ti, t3>, 
<tl, h, ?4>,心3’ ？4, <tu tl, ,3’ “>，心2，h, U, t5>, and <tu ,2，（3’ t4, t5>. 
By SGA, GST stores the generated subsequences and their 
corresponding counts. If privacy is not preserved, all the smart cards 
reveal the complete purchase histories to the data mining system. In this 
way, GST is able to store the actual counts of the generated subsequences. 
To explain why, we consider a purchase sequence S. For each smart card 
that contains 5, 5 is a subsequence of the revealed purchase sequence if 
privacy is not preserved. After receiving the revealed purchase sequence, 
by step 2 in SGA, S will be one of the generated subsequences and so the 
count of S in GST is increased by one. Therefore, the count of S stored in 
GST is the actual count of S. 
At any time, popular purchase sequences can be identified by 
extracting all the generated subsequences in GST with the count > te, 
where te is the extraction threshold. 
Definition 6 (Extraction threshold) Popular purchase sequences are 
the generated subsequences in GST with the corresponding count no less 
than the extraction threshold value. 
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The extraction threshold value is an important factor affecting the 
accuracy of the algorithm. This value depends on the algorithm used. 
For the baseline algorithm, since GST stores the actual counts, we set 
te = tpps. In this way, all popular purchase sequences can be identified 
without false alarms. Note that if a generated subsequence in GST is 
identified as a popular purchase sequence, no subsequences of this 
generated subsequence will be identified as popular purchase sequences 
anymore since this information is redundant. In other words, maximal 
popular purchase sequences are identified. 
However, there are two problems if the baseline algorithm is used 
directly. They are the high complexity of SGA and the invasion of privacy. 
Both problems can be solved by limiting the length of the revealed 
purchase sequence. For the first problem, since the complexity of SGA is 
0{ii ) or 0{n )，depending on the cost of matching for the proper 
subsequence for counting in step 2，where n is the length of the revealed 
purchase sequence, thus reducing n saves time and space in practice. For 
the second problem, although the data mining system never records the 
IDs of the smart cards, privacy is still not protected if the smart cards 
release their complete purchase history since someone may be able to 
guess who the cardholder is from the complete purchase history. 
2.4.2 Privacy Equation 
Before describing another algorithm, we introduce the privacy 
equation first: 
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^ . , Number of revealed purchase records 
Privacy = 1 
Total number of purchase records 
The privacy equation defines how much information is unrevealed. 
The privacy value (on the left hand side of the equation) is ranged from 0 
to 1 inclusively. A pre-defined privacy value is stored in each smart card. 
It is used to determine the number of revealed purchase records according 
to the privacy equation. For example, if the privacy value is 0.5 and the 
total number of purchase records is 10, then the number of revealed 
purchase records should be no more than 5. 
Note that the privacy equation mentioned above is different from the 
privacy definitions in the literature. The former defines how much 
information is unrevealed and the latter defines how (or how much) 
privacy is preserved. For more information about how privacy is preserved, 
please refer to Chapter 2.5. 
2.4.3 Random Subsequence Selection Algorithm (RSSA) 
A trivial solution to preserve privacy in this problem is to limit the 
amount of revealed information. In other words, only a subsequence 
(partial information) of the complete purchase history is revealed and the 
length of the subsequence is determined by the privacy equation. This 
method is called the Random Subsequence Selection Algorithm (RSSA). 
Intuitively, RSSA increases the difficulty in guessing the owner of the 
purchase history and reduces the amount of privacy breach. The following 
shows the 3 steps for RSSA: 
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Random Subsequence Selection Algorithm () 
1. Calculate the number of revealed purchases records by the 
privacy equation (note that the privacy value is pre-defined) 
2. Select a contiguous subsequence of the complete purchase 
history randomly with the length calculated in step 1 
3. Output the selected subsequence 
Algorithm 2: Random Subsequence Selection Algorithm (RSSA) 
If RSSA is used, then te should be smaller than tpps. It is because the 
counts of the popular purchase sequences stored in GST are smaller than 
the corresponding actual counts, as some of the smart cards may not be 
able to reveal the popular purchase sequence due to privacy reasons (for 
the choice of te, please refer to Chapter 2.5). Although privacy is preserved 
by RSSA, it is difficult to identify popular purchase sequences. It is 
because the information omitted by RSSA may be crucial to identify 
certain popular purchase sequences, and the amount unrevealed crucial 
information is not small. The simulation results (described in Chapter 2,6) 
show that the accuracy for RSSA of identifying popular purchase 
sequences is poor. 
2.4.4 Popular Items Selection Algorithm (PISA) 
In RSSA, the reason of decreased accuracy is that, the random 
selection may omit crucial information. To avoid the decreased accuracy, 
we should identify which record is crucial (for identifying popular 
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purchase sequences) before selecting records to reveal. A purchase record 
is regarded as crucial if it appears in a popular purchase sequence, since it 
allows us to construct the popular purchase sequence. Although we cannot 
know exactly which purchase record is crucial before identifying popular 
purchase sequences, we can know which record has a higher chance to be 
crucial by the following observation: if the total number of customers that 
make a purchase is no less than tpps, then the record of this purchase has a 
higher chance to be crucial. We called this purchase (record) to be a 
popular purchase (record). A popular purchase is defined as follows: 
Definition 7 (Popular purchase) A popular purchase is a purchase that 
the total number of customers that make this purchase is no less than tpp", 
where tpp“ is the popular purchase threshold. We set tppu = tpps. 
Popular purchase records are crucial since all the purchase records in 
a popular purchase sequence are popular purchases records (but not vice 
versa). The following shows the lemma: 
Lemma 1 Let PP be the set of all popular purchase records and PPS be 
the set of all purchase records in all popular purchase sequences. If tppu < 
tpps, then PPS is a subset of PP, i.e. PPS c PP. 
Proof: Assume PPS c PP is not true, i.e. there are some elements in 
PPS but not in PP, say e s.t. e e PPS and e 茫 PP. Since e e PPS, e is a 
purchase record of a popular purchase sequence, say S, i.e. e e S. Since S 
is a popular purchase sequence, \{P e D s.t. 5 c F}| > tpps (by Definition 
5), this implies |{P E D s.t. e e P} | > tpps, which is equivalent to ear > tpps. 
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Since tpp“ < tpps, therefore Cac > tppu. But e 茫 PP, Cac < tppu (by Definition 7). 
Contradiction, thus PPS c PP if < tpps. 
Therefore, the revealed purchase sequence should contain all the 
popular purchase records in order for the data mining system to achieve 
good accuracy. Popular purchase records can be identified easily at the end 
of the mining period. After the mining period, when the customer uses the 
smart card again, the information for the popular purchase records is 
provided to the smart card. Then, the smart card reveals the purchase 
sequences selected by the Popular Items Selection Algorithm (PISA), 
which is our proposed algorithm. In order to have a more general name for 
the algorithm, the term "popular items" is used instead of the term 
"popular purchase records". Before describing PISA, we need to define 
adjacent popular purchase records. This term is formally defined as 
follows: 
Definition 8 (Adjacent popular purchase records) Given a purchase 
sequence S = <t\, ti, ... tk>. For I <i <k, the popular purchase record r, 
and popular purchase record ti+\ are said to be adjacent popular purchases 
records. 
The following shows our proposed algorithm PISA: 
Popular Items Selection Algorithm () 
1. Prepare revealed purchase sequence(s) by two rules: 
a. Each popular purchase record in the purchase history is 
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included once in one of the revealed purchase sequences 
b. Adjacent popular purchases records should be included in 
the same revealed purchase sequence 
2. Discard the revealed purchase sequences with length < minlen 
3. Calculate the number of revealed purchase records by the 
privacy equation 
4. While total length of the revealed purchase sequences > the 
calculated value in step 3 
Reduce the length of the shortest revealed purchase 
sequence by 1’ discard it if it's new length < minlen 
5. Output the revealed purchase sequences 
Algorithm 3: Popular Items Selection Algorithm (PISA) 
Example: 
Purchase sequence = <tu h、u, ts, h, t-j, tg, t\o> 
minlen = 2 
Privacy value = 0.4 
Popular purchases records = t\, h, U, U, t-j, h and fio 
After step 1, there are three revealed purchase sequences: <ti, t2, h, 
U> and <?6, ^7，h> and <?io>. The last one is discarded in step 2. In step 3, 
the number of revealed purchase records is calculated and is equal to 6. In 
step 4，since the total length of the revealed purchase sequences is 7， 
which is longer than the allowed length, so the shortest revealed purchase 
sequence <广6， 7^，h> becomes ^7> (or <^7, h>). Finally, the two revealed 
purchase sequences are <t\, t2, h, h> and 心6，^7〉(or h>). 
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By PISA, the smart card may reveal more than one purchase 
sequence for each data mining process. If this happens, they do not 
overlap with each other. 
Same as that for RSSA, te should be smaller than tpps. In addition, we 
use different te values for the generated subsequences with different 
lengths for PISA. The reason and the method to choose different te values 
are described in Chapter 2.5. 
The simulation results (described in Chapter 2.6) show that the 




In this section, we first define accuracy. Then, we analyze RSSA, 
including the way to determine the te values and its accuracy. After that, 
we analyze PISA and prove that it is more accurate than RSSA. Finally, 
we prove why the popular sequences can be identified by PISA and 
describe how privacy is preserved by PISA. 
2.5.1 Accuracy 
Before analyzing the algorithms, we have to define accuracy. We use 
two statistical measures, namely recall and precision, to evaluate the 
accuracy of the algorithm. In this problem, they are calculated by the 
following two equations: 
Number of popular sequences correctly identified by the system 
Recall = 
Total number of popular sequences 
Precision - Number of popular sequences correctly identified by the system 
Total number of popular sequences identified by the system 
An algorithm (or a system) is said to have high accuracy if it has a 
high recall value and a high precision value. 
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2.5.2 Analysis of RSSA: Determine 4 values 
In this section, we first find out the probability for a popular sequence 
to be contained in a revealed purchase sequence. Then, according to this 
probability, we calculate the te values used by RSSA. 
Suppose a purchase history with length k contains a sequence P with 
length s. Let p be the privacy value, and let the number of revealed 
purchase records be r = (1-p) x k. The probability of having P as a 
subsequence of the revealed purchase sequence of a purchase history with 
length k by RSSA, which is denoted as ProbReveak, is calculated as 
follows: 
If r<s, ProbRevealk= 0 
If r > 5, ProbReveak 
_ number of possible locations of P in the revealed sequence 
number of possible locations of P in the purchase history 
( 印 
k-s + l 
Let MaxHistoryLength be the maximum possible length of the 
purchase history (i.e. maximum possible value of k). Thus s < k < 
MaxHistoryLength. We assume that k is evenly distributed between s and 
MaxHistoryLength inclusively. The probability of having P as a 
subsequence of the revealed purchase sequence by RSSA, which is 
denoted as ProbReveal, is calculated as follows: 
ProbReveulk 
ProbReveal = > . 
f^ MaxHistoryLength-s + 1 
We set privacy = 0.5 and MaxHistoryLength = 50. Fig 1 shows the 
ProbReveal values for different values of s. For example, the ProbReveal 
values when s equals to 1，5，10, and 15 are 0.49，0.353, 0.227, and 0.125 
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respectively (correct to 3 significant figures). 
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Fig. 1: The ProbReveal values for different values of s 
Recall that the total number of smart cards that contain a sequence P 
is the actual count of P, denoted as Pac- The count of P in the system is 
denoted as P。The probability for P is identified as a popular sequence by 
the data mining system is formulated as follows: 
Prob(P is identified) 
=Prob(P^ > te) 
=？rob{Pc = te) + Prob(Fc = ... + Prob(尸 c = Pac) 
Pac 
=Yu P-Ci ProbReveal' (1 - ProbReveaiy-'' (E2) 
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Fig. 2: The relationship between Prob(P is identified) and tg for P c^ = 100 
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After selecting some values for s, the corresponding values of 
ProbReveal are obtained from E l . Then, by using E2 and assuming Pac = 
100，we obtain the relationship between Prob(尸 is identified) and te (Fig.2). 
For the curves in Fig. 2, we can see that the largest te value for Prob(P is 
identified) = 1 (correct to 3 significant figures) is smaller for a larger s 
value. These largest te values for 5 = 1, 5, 10, and 15 are 33，20，10, and 3 
respectively. We call these largest te values as the optimal tei values if Pac 
=tpps, recall that tpps is the popular purchase sequence threshold. In 
addition, we can see that the smallest te value for Prob(P is identified) = 0 
(correct to 3 significant figures) is smaller for a larger s value. These 
smallest te values for ^ = 1, 5, 10，and 15 are 66, 52，38, and 25 
respectively. We call these smallest te values as the optimal te2 values if Pac 
二 tpps-
If we want to have a higher recall value, we should set the optimal tei 
value for s to be the te value for the generated subsequences in GST with 
length s. The idea is explained as follows. Consider a popular sequence PP 
with length 10 and PP^r = tpps = 100，by E l and E2, we get ProbReveal = 
0.227 and optimal tei = 10. For the generated subsequences with length 10, 
if te = 10’ then the probability for PP is identified as a popular sequence is 
1 (according to Fig.2). If te > 10’ then the probability for PP is identified 
as a popular sequence is less than 1. If te < 10, although the probability for 
PP is identified as a popular sequence is 1，the number of false alarms is 
more than that of te = 10. Moreover, if PPac > 100 and te = 10，then the 
probability for PP is identified as a popular sequence is 1 also, it is 
because the number of smart cards that reveal PP to the system should 
increase. Therefore, if tpps = 100’ the system should set te = optimal tei : 
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10 for the generated subsequences with length 10 in order to identify 
popular sequence PP. 
In general, if we want to have a higher recall value, we should 
determine the te value for a generated subsequences with length 5 by the 
following way. We first find out the corresponding ProbReveal value by 
E l with the value of Then, by E2, we use the ProbReveal value and 
substitute Pa(, by tpps to find out the corresponding optimal tei value. 
Finally, we use the optimal t^i value to be the te value for the generated 
subsequences with length s. We can see that the optimal tei value is 
determined by tpps and s. 
If we want to have no false alarms, we use optimal te2 to be the te 
value, the reason is elaborated in the next section. 
2.5.3 Analysis of RSSA: Accuracy 
In this section, we explain why the accuracy of RSSA is not high by a 
theoretical approach. 
For a sequence P with specific length, it corresponds to a ProbReveal 
value. For each ProbReveal value, it corresponds to an optimal tei value. 
Fig.3 shows the relationship between Prob(P is identified) and Pac for s -
1, 5, 10，and 15 when the optimal tei values obtained in Fig.2 are used. 
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Fig. 4: The relationship between Prob(P is identified) and P„c for = 1, 5，10，and 15 
when optimal te2 is used 
Consider a sequence P with length 10, then ProbReveal = 0.227. In 
Fig.3, the largest value of Pac for Prob(P is identified) = 0 is 15 and the 
smallest value of Pac for Prob(P is identified) = 1 is 97 (not equal to 100 
due to rounding errors). That means Prob(P is identified) = 0 for Pac ^ 15 
and Prob(P is identified) = 1 for Pac ^ 97. There are three cases for the 
value of tpps. 
Case 1: If tpps < 16, there is no false alarm, since for a non-popular 
sequence PP' with PP'ac < tpps, Prob(PP' is identified) = 0 for PP'ac < 16. 
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However, the system may not be able to identify a popular sequence PP 
for tpps < PPac < 97，since Prob(PP is identified) * 1 for PPac < 97. 
Case 2: If tpps > 97，the system can identify the popular sequence PP 
with PPac > tpps, since Prob(尸尸 is identified) 二 1 for PPac > 97. However, 
the system may identify non-popular sequence PP' as a popular sequence 
for 15 < PP'ar < tpps, that means false alarms may occur. 
Case 3: If 15 < tpps < 97, the system may not be able to identify a 
popular sequence PP with tpps < PPac < 97, and the system may incorrectly 
identify a non-popular sequence PP' with 15 < PP'ac < tpps as a popular 
sequence. 
From the above cases, we can see that if a sequence P with 15 < / V < 
97，the system may incorrectly identify this sequence. We call the range 
between the largest value of Pac for Prob(P is identified) 二 0 and the 
smallest value of Pac for Prob(尸 is identified) = 1 exclusively as the range 
of uncertainty. For example, the range of uncertainty for s = 10 is from 16 
to 96 inclusively. The system may incorrectly identify P if Pac is in this 
range. 
Actually, since optimal tei is used to obtain Fig.3, so tpp = 100 (i.e. 
case 2). The other cases described above correspond to the system that 
does not use the optimal tei and set te arbitrarily. Besides using the optimal 
tei, we can use the optimal tei value to be the te value for the generated 
subsequences with length s (Fig.4). Since tpp = 100, we can see that there 
is no false alarm if optimal te2 is used (case 1). Case 3 corresponds to 
choosing a te value where optimal tei <te< optimal te2. 
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RSSA is not accurate, because its range of uncertainty is wide. If the 
range is wider, then the chance of having a sequence P with Pac in this 
range is higher and thus the chance of identifying a sequence incorrectly is 
higher. From Fig.3 and Fig.4, we can see that for a larger s value, the 
range of uncertainty is wider. In Fig.3, the widths of the ranges of 
uncertainty for s = 15，10，5, and 1 are 89，81，67, and 55 respectively. In 
Fig.4, the widths of the ranges of uncertainty for s = 15，10’ 5，and 1 are 
247’ 158, 108’ and 78 respectively. 
2.5.4 Analysis of PISA 
In this section, we analyze PISA in the way similar to RSSA, except 
that some new terms are introduced. 
In the previous sections, we use the term PwbReveal as the 
probability of having a sequence (no matter it is a popular sequence or a 
non-popular sequence) as a subsequence of the revealed purchase 
sequence for RSSA. However, for PISA, the smart cards tend to reveal 
popular purchase records and thus the probabilities of revealing popular 
sequences and non-popular sequences are different. Therefore, we use 
ProbRevealPop and ProbRevealNonPop for PISA. ProbRevealPop is the 
probability of having a popular sequence P as a subsequence of the 
revealed purchase sequence of a purchase history by PISA and 
ProbRevealNonPop is the probability of having a non-popular sequence P' 
as a subsequence of the revealed purchase sequence of a purchase history 
by PISA. 
The calculation of the ProbRevealPop value and the 
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ProbRevealNonPop value is possible, but complicated. So we estimate 
these two values by simulation. The results are shown in Fig.5 - Fig.7. 
Similar to what we have done for RSSA, we assume that k is evenly 
distributed between s and MaxHistoryLength inclusively. We also set 
privacy = 0.5 and MaxHistoryLength = 50. 
In the estimation for the ProbRevealPop value and the 
ProbRevealNonPop value, we have to guess the value of ProbPRNonPop, 
where ProbPRNonPop is the probability for a purchase record to be a 
popular purchase record but not included in any popular sequences. 
ProbPRNonPop is an important factor affecting the accuracy of PISA. 
Since the idea of PISA is to select and reveal popular purchase records, if 
there is a popular purchase record that does not belong to any popular 
sequences, then ProbRevealPop may be affected as the quota for revealing 
the popular sequences may be used up by these records. However, besides 
the sequence that contains a popular sequence, the chance of having a long 
and connected sequence of popular purchase records is quite low. In 
addition, a short and connected sequence of popular purchase records may 
be discarded by step 4 of PISA. Therefore, popular sequences can be 
revealed in most cases. 
For the estimation of ProbRevealNonPop, we have to guess the value 
of ProbPP, where ProbPP is the probability for a purchase history to 
contain a popular sequence. If the ProbPP value is higher, the chance to 
reveal a long non-popular sequence is also higher. It is because if there is a 
popular purchase record, which is not included in any popular sequences, 
next to a popular sequence P, then the sequence obtained by merging this 
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record and P is a non-popular sequence. Therefore, in Fig.7, we can see 
that if the ProbPP value is higher, the PrvbRevealNonPop value is higher 
when s is larger. However, for 5 < 3, the ProbRevealNonPop value is 
higher if the ProbPP value is lower. It is because if the purchase history 
does not contain any popular sequences, the smart card reveals the popular 
purchase records that do not belong to any popular sequences instead. 
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Fig. 5: The ProbReveal Pop values for different values of j and ProbPRNonPop (obtained 
by simulation) 
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Fig. 6: The ProbRevealNonPop values for different values of s and ProbPRNonPop for 
ProbPP = 0.2 (obtained by simulation) 
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If ProbPRNonPop = 0.3 and ProbPP = 0.5, the ProbRevealPop 
values when s equals to 1’ 5, 10’ and 15 are 0.96’ 0.876，0.737, and 0.561 
respectively (correct to 3 significant figures) (Fig.5).The 
ProbRevealNonPop values when s equals to 1，5, 10，and 15 are 0.62, 
0.098，0.056, and 0.035 respectively (Fig.7). 
In the remaining of this section, we assume ProbPRNonPop = 0.3 
and ProbPP = 0.5, and these values are reasonable in the actual situation. 
By selecting some values of s, the corresponding values of ProbRevealPop 
are obtained from Fig.5. And then by using E2, we obtain the relationship 
between Prob(P is identified) and te for Pac = 100 (Fig.8). From Fig.8, the 
optimal tei values for s = 15, 10，5, and 1 are 40，59, 76, and 88 
respectively. The optimal te2 values for s = 15，10，5, and 1 are 73, 88，98， 
and 101 respectively. 
For a popular sequence P with specific length, it corresponds to a 
ProbRevealPop value. For each ProbRevealPop value, it corresponds to an 
optimal tei value and an optimal te2 value. For example, if s = 10，then 
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ProbRevealPop = 0.737, optimal tei value = 59, and optimal te2 value 二 88. 
Fig.9 shows the relationship between Prob(P is identified) and Pa(: for s 二 
1，5, 10，and 15 when the optimal tei values obtained in Fig.8 are used. 
Fig. 10 shows the above relationship when the optimal tei values are used. 
For a non-popular sequence P' with specific length, it corresponds to 
a ProbRevealNonPop value. For each PwbRevealNonPop value, it 
corresponds to an optimal tei and an optimal te2 value. For example, if s = 
10，then ProbRevealNonPop = 0.056, the optimal tei = 59 and the optimal 
te2 = 88. Fig. 11 shows the relationship between Prob(P' is identified) and 
P’ac for 5 = 1, 5, 10，and 15 when the optimal tei values are used. Fig. 12 
shows the above relationship when the optimal te2 values are used. _ WW 
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when optimal is used, where P is a popular sequence 
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In Fig.3 and Fig.4, where they describe the relationship between 
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Prob(P is identified) and Pac for RSSA, the tpps value does not affect the 
curves as RSSA is just selecting the revealed sequences randomly. 
However, for PISA, the tpps value affects the curve. It is because we set tpps 
=tppit (recall that tppu is the popular purchase threshold), and the tpp“ value 
determines which purchase is a popular purchase. Since the idea of PISA 
is to select popular purchase records, that means the tppu value affects the 
revealed sequence and thus it affects the probability for a popular 
sequence to be identified. In addition, the probability of revealing a 
popular sequence (ProbRevealPop) is different from the probability of 
revealing a non-popular sequence (ProbRevealNonPop). That means we 
have to combine the graphs for ProbRevealPop and ProbRevealNonPop to 
obtain the final graph in the way that the right hand side of the tpps value 
(Pac ^ tpps) corresponds to the graph for ProbRevealPop and the left hand 
side of the tpps value {Pac < tpps) corresponds to the graph for 
ProbRevealNonPop. 
Fig. 13 shows the combined graph of Fig.9 and Fig. 11 for tpps = 100 
when optimal tei is used. Fig. 14 shows the combined graph of Fig. 10 and 
Fig. 12 for tpps = 100 when optimal tgi is used. Note that the term P in these 
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Comparing Fig. 13 with Fig. 14, we can see that there is no need to use 
optimal te2 for PISA since the width of the range of uncertainty for optimal 
tei is almost equal to zero. Comparing the range of uncertainty in Fig. 13 
with that in Fig.3, we can see that the accuracy of PISA is much higher 
than that of RSSA. 
To conclude, in order to determine the te value for a generated 
subsequence with length s for PISA, we first find out the corresponding 
ProbRevealPop value from Fig.5. Then, we substitute Pac by tpps in E2 and 
find out the corresponding optimal tei value. Finally, we use the optimal tei 
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value to be the te value. 
2.5.5 Theoretical Proof for PISA 
The following theorem explains why the popular sequences can be 
identified by PISA. 
Theorem 1 When PISA is used, if every smart card is able to satisfy 
the following two conditions: 
(CI) Release all the popular purchase records in the purchase history 
(C2) Include adjacent popular purchase records in the same purchase 
sequence 
Then all the popular sequences can be identified. 
Proof: Consider the smart cards that contain a popular sequence P. 
Since every purchase record in P is a popular purchase record (by lemma 
1) and adjacent popular purchase record (records in a contiguous sequence 
must be adjacent to each other), P must be contained in one of the 
revealed purchase sequences of a smart card that satisfies CI and C2. 
Therefore, in GST, P is one of the generated subsequences for this 
revealed purchase sequence. If every smart card is able to satisfy CI and 
C2, the count of P in GST is the actual count of P. Thus, the system can 
identify P as a popular sequence. Note that the above is still valid if the 
smart card contains more than one popular sequence. So, all the popular 
sequences can be identified. 
Practically, there is a problem for satisfying CI in Theorem 1. 
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Privacy is protected by step 4 of PISA, but it prevents the smart card to 
reveal all popular purchase records in the purchase history. That is why 
practically not all the popular sequences are identified and te should be 
less than tpps. However, simulation results show that the accuracy of PISA 
is still high by using suitable values of te (Please refer to Chapter 2.6). 
2.5.6 Privacy Protection 
There are three ways for PISA to preserve privacy. The first one is 
that, there are no IDs for the smart cards and the revealed purchase 
sequences. In this way, others cannot tell the owner of a purchase 
sequence easily. In addition, others cannot combine the revealed purchase 
sequences for the same smart cards in the same or different mining period 
to obtain extra information. 
The second one is that, PISA only reveals popular purchase records 
In other words, non-popular purchase records are never revealed by any 
smart card, and thus SCT never contain information for any non-popular 
purchase records. Therefore, others cannot view nor infer the non-popular 
purchase record of any individual (customer) from SCT. Note that a 
non-popular purchase is usually more private, as it corresponds to a fewer 
number of individuals. Since PISA is able to prevent the privacy breach of 
non-popular purchase records, we claim that PISA preserves privacy. 
According to [17], although the method of preserving privacy by 
removing the information of some entries is susceptible to the problem of 
having these entries inferred subsequently after the mining of database, the 
non-revealed purchase history still cannot be inferred in our case. It is 
because SCT never contains any non-popular purchase records. 
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The third one is that, the number of revealed records is limited by the 
privacy value. This can prevent a smart card reveals all the records if all of 
them are popular purchase records. In addition, this prevents others from 
knowing the non-revealed purchase records are popular purchase records 
or not, thus this increases the difficulty in guessing the non-revealed 
information. 
Recently, the /:-anonymity strategy is proposed in [23, 24] and a 
number of papers follows this strategy. Unfortunately, this strategy is 
difficult to work in our case. 
The author suggests that preserving privacy only by removing the 
explicit identifiers (e.g. phone number, address, ID card number) is not 
enough. Others may still be able to identify the owner of certain record (a 
row in the database) by linking the database with external information. It 
is because some attributes in combination can also identify individuals 
(e.g. birth date and gender). A set of such attributes is called a 
quasi-identifier. A database is 众-anonymous if there are at least k entries in 
any possible combination of the attributes in the quasi-identifier. 
In order to use the /:-anonymity model, there is an assumption: the 
data holder can accurately identify the quasi-identifier. Without such 
assumption, the database is less anonymous and individuals may be more 
easily identified. In traditional databases, quasi-identifiers can usually be 
identified properly. 
However, in our case, any combination of attributes is possible to 
identify an individual and all the attributes have equal chance to be linked 
with external information. That means the quasi-identifier has to be the set 
of all attributes. In this way, in order for our database to be /:-anonymous, 
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all the counts in the database have to be no less than k. Otherwise, the 
generated subsequence with the corresponding count less than k violates 
the /:-anonymous property as the generated subsequence is a subset of the 
quasi-identifier. 
In our model, it is difficult to have a database with no counts less 
than k. We assume that our system is semi-honest, which means it strictly 
follows the given algorithms, but it may mine extra information (about 
certain individual) with the final database and all the intermediate results. 
Although it is possible to have a final database with all the counts less than 
k by deleting some entries and the mining of popular paths is not affected 
(when k < tpp), it is not possible to prevent the intermediate databases have 
counts less than k. Therefore, /:-anonymity cannot be applied into our case. 
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2.6 Simulations 
We performed simulations with an artificial set of purchase histories. 
In the simulations, one thousand service providers are monitored. We set 
privacy = 0.5, minlen = 5, total number of smart cards = 1000，tpps = 0.1 x 
number of smart cards, and number of popular sequences = 3. We also set 
the actual counts of three non-popular sequences close to but not exceed 
tpps. The recall and precision values are calculated by considering the 
number of maximal popular sequences correctly identified by the system. 
The following describes how purchase histories are generated. Firstly, 
a number of pre-defined popular sequences are generated randomly. Then, 
for each popular sequence, a number of smart cards (a random number no 
less than the popular sequence threshold) are forced to possess it and each 
of their purchase histories is extended randomly base on the corresponding 
popular sequence. Similar for the non-popular sequences, except that the 
number of smart cards that possess each of them is less than the popular 
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Fig. 15: The accuracy of RSSA and PISA 
There are four simulation sets. The first set uses RSSA with optimal 
tei, the second set uses PISA with optimal te], the third set uses RSSA with 
optimal te2, and the fourth set uses PISA with optimal te2. The average 
recall values and average precision values are shown in Fig. 15. From the 
result, we can see that PISA with optimal tei has the best performance 
(recall = 0.983 and precision =0.946). The result agrees with the analysis 
in Chapter 2.5. 
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Fig. 16: The accuracy of PISA with optimal tei for different number of smart cards 
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In addition, we investigate PISA with optimal tei when the number of 
smart cards increases. The result is shown in Fig. 16. We observe that 
PISA is more accurate when the number of smart cards increases. This 
phenomenon can be explained as follows. Let n be the number of smart 
cards that contain sequence S and let p be the probability for a revealed 
sequence to contain S. If the system receives m revealed sequences that 
contain S, then the system estimates that there are m/p smart cards 
containing S. By the law of large numbers, if n is large, then m/p tends to 
n. Thus, the system is more accurate when the number of smart cards 
increases. 
Number of smart cards Time used (second) Number of entries in GST 
1,000 0.52 203 
10,000 0.63 405 
100,000 1.59 1100 
Table 4: Time and space used by PISA 
Table 4 shows the time and space used by PISA. The simulations 
were carried out on a 3.2GHz Pentium 4 processor running Linux. The 
result shows that PISA only uses 1.59 seconds and 1,100 entries, where 
each of the entries contains a subsequence and the corresponding count, to 
identify popular purchase sequences for 100,000 smart cards. 
47 
Chapter 3 
A Transportation System 
The objective of this chapter is to describe how to apply our proposed 
algorithm into another problem domain: a transportation system. This 
chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, an introduction is given. Then, we 
present the related work in this problem domain. After that, we define the 
model and finally present the algorithms for a transportation system. 
When applying the proposed algorithm into a transportation system, 
although there is no big modification in the definitions and the algorithms, 




A traffic monitoring system is useful in a large and busy city for city 
planning and development. Traditional traffic monitoring systems only 
deploy sensors on each road. They can only record the number of vehicles 
that pass through each road separately, such as RHODES presented in [29]. 
Popular paths cannot be identified by this limited information, as a path 
obtained by connecting the popular roads may not be a popular path, 
where a popular road is one of the most frequently used road between two 
conjunctions. However, identifying popular paths in the transportation 
system is useful, since we can know where new roads should be 
constructed to in order to improve the traffic condition. 
One simple solution to this problem is to assign a unique ID to every 
vehicle. When a vehicle passes through a road, the static sensor deployed 
on the road records the ID of the vehicle. Hence, by merging the results of 
the static sensors, the system can identify the complete movement history 
of every vehicle and store it into a database. After a number of movement 
histories are recorded, popular paths can be identified from the database. 
However, no privacy is protected for this simple solution and thus the 
system is not feasible. 
In order to apply the proposed algorithm into the transportation 
system, static sensors are deployed on every road and mobile sensors are 
installed in every vehicle. Each static sensor has a unique ID but there is 
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no unique ID for the mobile sensors. All the static sensors are connected to 
form a static network and so they can communicate with each other. A 
central system is connected to the static network. A mobile sensor and a 
static sensor can communicate with each other if their distance is within 
certain range. During the travel of a vehicle, its mobile sensor records the 
movement history of the vehicle by merging the unique ID of each road it 
passed through. When the vehicle reaches the destination, the mobile 
sensor first extracts the path information from the movement history 
according to the proposed algorithm, then the path information is revealed 
to the nearest static sensor and finally it is forwarded to the central system. 
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3.2 Related Work 
In this section, we present the literature review of the popular paths 
identification problem in a transportation system. This problem domain is 
more practical, it often involves constructing a system by using sensors. 
Therefore, besides the review of theoretical researches, our literature 
review also includes the technical issues and the structures of traffic 
monitoring systems. 
Similar to identifying customer behaviors in a smart card system, it 
seems that identifying popular paths in a transportation system is also 
identical to identifying frequent itemsets. It is because we can take each 
road as an item in a market-basket database, and take a vehicle passes 
through that road as the driver purchases that item. In this way, the 
connected frequent itemsets are regarded as the popular paths. There are 
many efficient algorithms proposed in the literature [12，30] that solve the 
problem of finding frequent itemsets. Furthermore, quite a number of them 
are focusing on privacy preserving, such as [19]. However, similar to the 
case in the smart card system, there exists some connected frequent 




Fig. 17: An example of a road graph 
Suppose there are nine vehicles passing through the path ‘‘abcde”, 
and two vehicles passing through the path ' W . If a popular path is a path 
passed through by at least 10 vehicles, then "ae" is identified as a frequent 
itemset. Since "a" and "e" are connected, this implies "ae" is a popular 
path. However, is not a popular path since there are only two vehicles 
passed through it. In general, there is a counting error for the path that 
formed by connecting the path that enters the loop and the path that leaves 
the loop. In an extreme case, the popular path identified by the frequent 
itemset algorithm is not a popular path actually. That means there are false 
alarms even privacy is not preserved. Since a road map usually contains 
cycles, therefore frequent itemset algorithms cannot be used to solve the 
popular path problem. Another reason for not using frequent itemset 
algorithms is that, it is possible for a vehicle to pass through the same road 
segment for more than one time in one trip, but an itemset cannot contain 
duplicate items 
The algorithms presented by many papers concerning about 
privacy-preserving data mining need a database (trusted entity) to contain 
all the information [19]. However, in our proposed algorithm, the database 
does not contain all the path information. Therefore, drivers do not need to 
worry about the privacy breach due to human errors, sniffers, or hackers. 
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Recently, mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) [33] has been deployed 
in the transportation system in order to automate the traffic measuring and 
monitoring process. In particular, this kind of systems is called vehicular 
MANET. Traffic events such as accidents or congestion can be detected by 
the sensors on vehicles or static stations on roadside. Data can be quickly 
disseminated among vehicles in real time. Information such as traffic flow 
statistics or alerts can be propagated and replicated among static stations. 
Therefore, the lag time between the occurrence and notification of traffic 
events can be greatly reduced. In addition, the movement histories of 
vehicle are being available if they are recorded by the sensors on vehicles 
or those vehicles are being tracked by the static stations. 
The RHODES [48] is a system dealing with the traffic flow of the 
transportation system. One of the functions of it is to estimate the load of 
road segments. However, this information alone is not sufficient to 
construct the popular path of the transportation system. 
There are some studies aiming at the prediction of the 
movement/location of the mobile devices, such as BBS [49], DCP [50] 
and Mobility Prediction Algorithm [51]. All of the above algorithms need 
to identify movement patterns from a group of users, which is similar to 
our problem. However, they need to use all the movement information of 
the users, which means privacy is not protected. 
Recent research focuses on the data dissemination policy for highly 
dynamic MANET [33, 34]. SQL like queries also supported for users to 
retrieve information from the system. Performance of these kinds of 
in-network query processing is closely related to the underlying routing 
algorithms such as AODV [35], DSDV [36]，DSR [37], ZRP [38], 
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Directed Diffusion [39] etc. Data mining and data gathering over the 
continuous data streams from sensor network have been the subjects of 
increasing attention recently. Related systems are known as sensor 
database system. Cornell Cougar [40] and Berkeley TinyDB [41] are two 
representative projects. Methodologies integrating approximate query 
processing, data mining and distributed relational database technology has 
been proposed to partially improve the existing sensor network systems. 
The goal is to reduce communication, local storage demand, and energy 
consumption by doing more local and in-network computation. The ideas 
include: lossy compression and aggregation that reduces data volume by 
exploiting spatial-temporal correlation [32, 42-44]; approximate query 
processing based on statistical analysis and prediction with adaptive 
acceptable error [45]; data caching and replication that increase 
availability and robustness [46], computing aggregates with gossip-style 
protocol [47]. 
There is also a research solving a problem similar to the popular path 
problem, it is Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) for IP Traceback [31], 
but the background is a computer network instead of a transportation 
system. IP traceback is a technique for tracing anonymous packets 
backward to the source. When a victim is being suffered from packet 
flooding attacks, there will be heavy flows along the paths from the 
attackers to the victim. PPM is one of the methods allows the victim to 
identify the network paths traversed by the attack packets. The main idea 
is marking the attack packets by the intermediate routers, which are 
selected according to a predefined probability function. A collection of 
marked attack packets received at the victim can then be used to 
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reconstruct the attack paths. However, the techniques of IP traceback for 
DDOS are not applicable in the transportation system. It is because there 
is an assumption that all the traffic flows are directed to the victim and the 
origins of attack are unlikely to change [32]. On the contrary, the traffic 
flows in a transportation system are changing continuously and the set of 
popular paths are directing to different directions. 
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3.3 Model 
In this section, we present the model for the transportation system. 
This model is similar to that of the smart card system, except that it 
includes a graph, which represents a road map. 
In a city, the transportation system consists of a number of roads. 
These roads are connected together and they form a road map. The 
topology of the road map does not change very often. In our model, we 
use a graph to represent the road map, which is defined as follows: 
Definition 9 (Road graph) A road map of a region is represented by a 
multi-directed graph G = <V, E>. Each node v e V represents a 
conjunction of the roads. Each directed edge (M, V) e E represents a 
one-way road, where u, v e V. The direction of the road is indicated by the 
direction of the corresponding edge. 
Each edge e e E has a unique edge ID (or road ED), denoted as e!, 
where i is a positive integer. A static sensor is deployed on each edge 
(road). All the static sensors in the road map form a static network. Fig. 18 
shows an example of a road map: 
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Fig. 18: An example of another road graph 
Note that in the smart card system, it also consists of a graph. Since it 
is possible for a customer to purchase any product after he has purchased a 
certain product, this graph is a complete graph with n nodes, such that 
every node is connected to all other nodes, where n is the number of 
products. Therefore, the model does not include a graph, as it does not 
contain any useful information. In contrast, the graph in the transportation 
system indicates the structure of the road map and the degrees of the nodes. 
That is why a graph is needed in this problem domain. 
A trip of a vehicle includes a source, a destination, and a navigation 
path. The travel of a vehicle forms a navigation path (or simply a path), 
which is represented by a sequence of connected edges. A path is formally 
defined as follows: 
Definition 10 (Path) A path P with length m is a sequence of edges <e\, 
62, ...’ e,n>, where 二 (mm , m/) e E for i = 1, 2, m. We denote e,- e P, 
written as path P contains edge e,-’ for i = 1，2，...，m. 
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Note that the definition of a path in a smart card system is very 
similar to the definition of a purchase sequence (definition 2, in Chapter 
2.3) in a smart card system, where a purchase sequence defined as a 
sequence of items. 
A subpath of a path P is a contiguous subsequence of path P. In fact, 
the definition of a subpath is defined in the same way as that of a 
subsequence (definition 3). It is rewritten as follows: 
Definition 11 (Subpath) Let A = <ai，a2, ..., a„> and B = <b\, bi,...， 
b,n> be two paths. B is a subpath of A, denoted as B c A, iff 5 is a 
contiguous subsequence of A, i.e. b\ = a„ £>2= a,+i, ..., b,„= where 1 < 
i < n-m+\. 
The actual count of P, denoted as Pa。is the number of vehicles 
passing through path P. It is defined in the same way as in definition 4 and 
is rewritten as follows: 
Definition 12 (Actual count of a path/subpath) Let P be a 
path/subpath. The number of vehicles passing through P is the actual 
count of P, which is denoted as Par. 
The objective of our proposed algorithm is to identify popular paths 
in the transportation system. A popular path is a path/subpath having the 
count no less than the popular path threshold tpp with length no shorter 
than minlen. The reason of having a length limit is to avoid identifying 
popular paths that are too short to be useful. A popular path is defined in 
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the same way as a popular purchase sequence (definition 5). It is rewritten 
as follows: 
Definition 13 (Popular Path) Given a set of paths D and a popular path 
threshold tpp, a subpath P with length m is a popular path iff m > minlen 
and it occurs as a subpath in all paths in D for at least tpp times, i.e. |{S 6 
D s.t. P c S}| > fpp and Pac ^  tpp. Note that minlen > 1. 
Usually, the data miners are interested in identifying the maximal 




As mentioned in previous chapters, in a smart card system, each 
smart card contains a purchase history, which is a sequence of purchase 
records, of a customer. Now, in a transportation system, each mobile 
sensor of a vehicle contains a movement history, which is a sequence of 
edge IDs, of a driver. In the view of our proposed algorithms presented in 
Chapter 2.4，the only modification is that a sequence of purchase records 
is replaced by a sequence of edge IDs. However, they can be regarded as 
the same thing since they are both a sequence of items. In addition, the 
nature of the items is not important to the algorithm. Therefore, our 
proposed algorithms can be used directly in the transportation system. 
In Chapter 2.4，we define a popular purchase record and adjacent 
popular purchase records. In this problem domain, these two terms are 
rewritten as a popular road and adjacent popular purchase records 
respectively. They are defined as follows: 
Definition 14 (Popular road) A popular road is a road that passed 
through by at least tpr vehicles, where tpr is the popular road threshold. We 
set tpr — tpp. 
Definition 15 (Adjacent popular roads) Given a movement history P 
= <己1，62, ... ek>. For i<i<k, the popular road e! and popular road are 
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said to be adjacent popular roads. 
Moreover, the privacy equation is rewritten as follows: 
n . 1 Number of revealed road IDs 
Privacy = 1 
Total number of road IDs 
Finally, the three algorithms described in Chapter 2.4 are rewritten as 
follows: 
Subsequence Generation Algorithm (subpath/sequence P) 
1. Generate all the possible contiguous subsequences of P with 
length > minlen 
2. For each generated subsequence G generated in step 1 
If G exists in the GST 
Gc = Gc+ 1, where Gc is the count of G in GST 
Else 
A new entry G is created with Gc= 1 
Algorithm 1: Subsequence Generation Algorithm (SGA) 
Random Subsequence Selection Algorithm () 
1. Calculate the number of revealed road IDs by the privacy 
equation (note that the privacy value is pre-defined) 
2. Select a contiguous subsequence of the complete movement 
history randomly with the length calculated in step 1 
3. Output the selected subsequence 
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Algorithm 2: Random Subsequence Selection Algorithm (RSSA) 
Popular Items Selection Algorithm () 
1. Prepare revealed subpath(s) by two rules: 
a. Each popular road ED in the movement history is included 
once in one of the revealed subpaths 
b. Adjacent popular road IDs should be included in the same 
revealed subpath 
2. Discard the revealed subpaths with length < minlen 
3. Calculate the number of revealed edge IDs by the privacy 
equation 
4. While total length of the revealed subpaths > the calculated 
value in step 3 
Reduce the length of the shortest revealed subpath by 1， 
discard it if it's new length < minlen 
5. Output the revealed subpaths 
Algorithm 3: Popular Items Selection Algorithm (PISA) 
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3.5 Simulations 
Similar to Chapter 2.6, we performed simulations with an artificial set 
of movement histories on a road map, which is a 100x100 grid. We set 
privacy = 0.5, minlen = 5, total number of smart cards = 1000, tpps = 0.1 x 
number of vehicles, and number of popular paths = 3. We also set the 
actual counts of three non-popular sequences close to but not exceed ？聊. 
The recall and precision values are calculated by considering the number 
of maximal popular paths correctly identified by the system. 
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Fig. 19: The accuracy of RSSA and PISA 
Same as what we have done in Chapter 2.6, four simulation sets are 
performed. Fig. 19 shows the average recall values and average precision 
values are shown. From the result, we can see that PISA with optimal tei 
has the best performance (recall = 0.967 and precision =0.756). The result 
agrees with the analysis in Chapter 2.5. 
63 
The next simulation focuses on the differences between applying the 
proposed algorithm in a transportation system and in a smart card system. 
Although these two problem domains are similar, there is a difference in 
these two models. The average degree of the graph that represents the 
transportation system is much smaller than that represents the smart card 
system. Recall that in the transportation system, a node represents a road 
conjunction and thus the average degree of each node should be small. 
However, in the smart card system, we use a graph to represent a 
marketplace, where each node represents a product and the degree of each 
node is equal to the number of products, which should be a large number 
(see Chapter 4 for more details). By the differences in the average degrees 
of these two graphs, we expect different performance of our algorithm. 
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Fig. 20: The accuracy of PISA in a transportation system and in a smart card system 
Fig. 20 shows the accuracy of PISA in the transportation system and 
in the smart card system. We observe that PISA is less accurate in the 
transportation system, which is the one has a lower degree graph. It is 
because for a node with a smaller degree, there are fewer choices for the 
64 
next node. In this way, the paths formed in this graph are more 
"concentrated" and so they have higher actual counts. If the average actual 
count is higher, then the difference between the average actual count and 
the popular path threshold is smaller. That means it is more difficult to 
distinguish between popular paths and non-popular paths and thus false 
alarms are easier to occur. Therefore, the PISA is less accurate for a lower 
degree graph than for a higher degree graph, especially for the precision 
measurement. 
Note that although PISA is less accurate with a lower degree graph, 
the accuracy is still quite high and it has a trend that converges to 100% 
when the number of individuals increases. 
The last simulation studies the difference in accuracy between the 
following two cases: 
1) Different te values are used for the generated subsequences with 
different lengths. 
2) A fixed te value is used for all the generated subsequences regardless 
the length. 
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Fig. 21: The accuracy of RSSA and PISA using fixed te for 1000 vehicles 
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In fact, the simulation for case 1 has been performed and the result is 
already shown in Fig. 20. For 1000 vehicles, the recall and precision value 
for PISA are 0.967 and 0.794 respectively. The result for case 2 is shown 
in Fig. 21. Several te values are tested separately. For te = 50, PISA obtains 
the highest recall value and the highest precision value and they are 0.933 
and 0.738 respectively. Comparing with the result in Fig. 20，we can see 
that using different te values for the generated subpaths with different 




Enhanced Features for a Smart 
Card System 
In Chapter 2，we introduce the proposed algorithm in a general way 
in the sense that the algorithm can be applied into other problem domains. 
In this Chapter, we present some enhanced features that can be added 
when the proposed algorithm is actually applied to a smart card system. In 
Chapter 4.1，we describe how to include the purchase time information 
into the popular purchase sequences. In Chapter 4.2，we describe a way to 
generalize the purchased items in order for the popular paths to exist and 
allowing the algorithm to mine different information. 
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4.1 Adding Time Information 
4.1.1 Motivation 
In the original model described in Chapter 2.3, although date and 
time information is stored into the smart card when a purchase is made, 
this information is not included explicitly in the original model, and it is 
only used for the ordering of the purchases. In this way, after the 
identification of the popular purchase sequences, although we know the 
purchase orders, we cannot tell the actual purchase time difference 
between different products. This is the motivation of adding purchase time 
information into the purchase sequences. 
4.1.2 Time intervals 
Time is a continuous measurement. In our new model, we divide the 
whole data-mining period into m non-overlapping time intervals, so that 
each purchase belongs to a certain time interval. We use integers from 1 to 
m inclusively to denote the time intervals, where a smaller integer 
represents an earlier interval. If time intervals are taken into consideration, 
more information can be obtained from the popular purchase sequences. 
For example, if a one-day time interval is used, we may obtain the 
following results: many customers purchase bread once in three days, and 
many customers purchase aspirin in the day after they purchased many 
alcohol drinks. In our original model described in Chapter 2.3，after the 
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mining of popular sequences, we only know the purchase orders, but we 
cannot tell the time difference between two purchases. 
4.1.3 Original graph 
We use a graph to model the situation when time intervals are added. 
In fact, in the original model, a complete directed graph with n nodes is 
"hidden" in a smart card system, where n is the number of products. In this 
graph, a node represents a product and a directed edge represents a 
possible "movement" from a node to another node. Since it is possible for 
a customer to purchase any product after he has purchased a certain 
product, all the nodes are connected to each other, and each of them 
contains self-loop. Therefore, the in-degree and the out-degree of each 
node is n, this graph is a complete graph. The original graph is defined as 
follows: 
Definition 16 (Original Graph) The marketplace monitored by the 
data miner is represented by a directed graph G = <V, E>. A node v e V 
represents a product. A directed edge (m, v) e E represents it is possible to 
purchase a product represented by node v after the purchase of a product 
represented by node u. G is a complete directed graph and every node has 
a self-loop. Let n be the number of products. Therefore, |Vl = n and = 
,z2. 
The original graph is not included explicitly in the old model since it 
does not contain any useful information. An example of a complete graph 
mentioned about with 7i = 4 is shown in Fig. 22: 
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M 
Fig. 22: A complete directed graph (with self-loops) for /i = 4 
4.1.4 New graph 
In our new model, each time interval has a complete graph G defined 
in definition 16. We denote the complete graph for time interval i as 
subgraph, or G,. There are m time intervals, so there are m subgraphs. Each 
subgraph is a complete directed graph with n nodes, which means all the 
subgraphs have an identical structure. The graph for the new model is 
obtained by connecting all the subgraphs with the following two rules. 
The first rule is that, when we say subgraph,- is connected to 
subgraph； (or G, is connected to Gj), each node in subgraph, has a directed 
edge connected from it to all the nodes in subgraph^. Fig. 23 shows an 
example for subgraph,- connecting to subgraph；, where n = 2 for both 
subgraphs. 
Subgraph i Subgraph i 
Fig. 23: Subgraph, connects to subgraph； 
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The second rule is that, for V/ < j’ where i, j = 1 ,… ’ m，subgraph/ 
connects to subgraph. The meaning is that, it is possible for a customer to 
purchase any product after he purchased a certain product, providing that 
the time interval of the earlier purchase is not later than that of the later 
purchase. 
From the above two rules, a graph for our new model, where time 
intervals are included, is defined as follows: 
Definition 17 (Graph) A directed graph G' = <V, E’> represents the 
marketplace that is monitored by the data miner, where purchase time 
information (the time interval) is included. The whole data-mining period 
is divided into m non-overlapping time intervals. Let G, = £"/>be the 
complete graph (in definition 16) for time interval i, where i = 1, m. 
For = u V2 u ... u V,n. For E\ there exists a directed edge {u\ v') 
6 E,, where u\ v' e K iff (w’，v') e for any / 二 1，."，m or e Ej, v，g 
Ek for I <j < k<m. Recall that n is the number of products, so = nm 
and |£"| = / r m + 爪 ) . A node is denoted as A/, which mean product 
A is purchased in time interval L 
Derivation of |£"|: 
E, I = number of intra edges of a subgraph x number of subgraphs 
+ total number of inter edges between the subgraphs 
= n^m + [n(m-l) + n(m-2) + ... + n(m-m)] 
二 /z2m + n[m2 - (l+2+...+m)] 
2 r 2 川("I + 1) 1 
= m + n [m ] 
2 
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An example of a graph defined in definition 17 with n = 2 and m = 3 
is shown in Fig. 24: 
Time interval 1 Time interval 2 Time interval 3 
Fig. 24: A graph for the new model, where n = 2 and m = 3 
4.1.5 Adding the New Graph into the Model 
When the new graph G' is included in the new model, a purchase 
sequence is actually a path in G'. Mining popular paths in G, is the same 
as identifying popular purchase sequences, and each purchase record of 
the purchase popular purchase sequences contain the purchase time 
information, it tells us the purchase is made in which time interval. 
For example, six products are monitored, namely, A(aspirin), 
5(bread), C(chocolate), D(alcohol drinks), £'(egg), and F(fish) and the 
whole data-mining period is divided into seven time intervals, where each 
time interval represents one day. By adding the new graph into the model, 
each purchase record tells us a certain product is purchase in a certain 
interval. We denote product A is purchased at time interval 2 as A2. An 
example of a popular purchase sequence is B1QD4B4’ it tells us that many 
customers purchase B(bread) once in three days from this sequence. 
Another example is D3D3D3D3D3A4, it tells us that many customers 
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purchase aspirin in the day after they purchased many alcohol drinks, and 
most probably, they use aspirin to cure hangover. Therefore, we can see 
that there is a need to educate people that it is harmful to do so. 
4.1.6 Rewriting the Definition of a Path 
Adding a new graph into the model is just the same as what we have 
done in the transportation system (Chapter 3). In Chapter 3，the path is 
made up of edges (definition 10). In our new model, the path is made up 
of nodes and is defined as follows: 
Definition 18 (Path) A path P with length r is a sequence of nodes <vi, 
V2,…，Vr>, where v,- e Y for i = 1, 2, r. 
No modifications of the other definitions and the algorithms are 
needed in order for the proposed algorithm to work. Note that the actual 
counts of the products are reset to zero after each time interval. 
4.1.7 Drawback of Adding Time Information 
The biggest drawback of adding time information is that, popular 
paths may not exist after adding time information. The reason is that, the 
actual counts of the products are shared among different time intervals and 
so they cannot reach the popular purchase threshold. Note that if purchase 
time information is not included, the number of time interval is one and 
actually, it is the whole data-mining period. One possible solution to this 
problem is to lower the popular purchase threshold. However, it has to be 
done with caution since if the popular purchase threshold is too low; there 
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will be too many popular purchases, and so our proposed algorithm PISA 
is less accurate since the efficiency in discarding useless information is 
decreased. 
Another possible solution to this problem is to use generalization 
described in Chapter 4.2. In fact, adding purchase time information is a 
kind of specialization, which is the opposite of generalization. It is 
because the purchase of a certain product is divided into different time 
intervals. In the last section of Chapter 4.2，we present the relationship 




The average degree of the graph for the transportation system is 
much smaller than that for the smart card system. In the smart card system, 
without considering the time intervals described in Chapter 4.1, the 
degrees for every node of the graph is n. As there are many choices for the 
next node, the customers have less chance to follow the same path. 
Therefore, we can imagine that it is more difficult for a popular path to 
form in the smart card system. This problem is not related to the 
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, but the model instead. 
One possible solution to this problem is lowering the popular path 
threshold. However, this solution is less flexible as all the purchases are 
affected. Recall that we set the popular purchase threshold equals to the 
popular path threshold; lowering the popular path threshold increases the 
chance for the purchases to become popular purchases. If there are too 
many popular purchases, our proposed algorithm PISA is less accurate 
since the efficiency in discarding useless information is decreased. 
Therefore, we need another way to increase the chance for popular 
paths to form. 
4.2.2 Generalization 
In Chapter 2，we define a purchase sequence to be a sequence of 
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items (definition 2) and an item is defined as a product/service purchased 
by the customers (definition 1). Now, we define an item to be a group of 
products/services, so that if a customer purchases any one of them, his 
purchase history will contain this item. In general, we should group 
similar products and services only; otherwise, the mined information may 
not be meaningful. The process of grouping similar products/services is 
called generalization. Note that when we group several products into an 
item, the actual count of this item is the summation of the number of 
customers that purchase those products. 
An example is grouping all the brands of a certain product, say 
chocolate, into an item. It is especially useful when the data miner is not 
interested in the brand of the chocolate, but instead it is interested in which 
customer tends to purchase chocolate. Another example is grouping 
similar bus routes. It is especially useful the mining of a rough location, 
such as the district, is already enough. From this example, we can see that 
another advantage of using generalization is allowing the algorithm to 
mine different information. 
However, one of the possible drawback is, if we generalize too much, 
the identified popular purchase sequences may be too general to be useful. 
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4.3 Specialization vs. Generalization 
As mentioned in Chapter 4.1, adding purchase time information is a 
kind of specialization, which is the opposite of generalization. If purchase 
time information is included, there may be no popular paths in the 
marketplace since the actual counts of the items are shared among 
different time intervals. If this really happens, we need to use 
generalization. In this way, the actual counts of certain products are added 
together and the summation is the actual count of an item. That means 
generalization offset the decreased actual count of an item due to adding 
time information. In other words, adding time intervals decreases the 
chance for popular paths to exist, while generalization increases such 
chance. 
Adding time information allows the data miner to mine additional 
information. Generalization has allows the data miner to mine different 
information that suits its need. When both of them are used, their 
drawbacks are cancelled out. 
There is a still drawback in both of them that cannot be cancelled out. 
The drawback is, there are no rules for data miner to decide how many 
time intervals should be used and how much generalization should be 
performed. Data miner needs to make decisions before the collection of 
smart cards' data, since the revealed contents of the purchase records may 
be different for different number of time intervals and different 
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generalization. For example, the time stamp of a purchase is used to 
decide the time interval of the purchase, and only the time interval is 
revealed to the system but not the time stamp. Another example is, when a 
product is grouped with other products and form an item, only the item ID 
is revealed to the system, but not the product ID. 
Although the data miner may be able to collect the data again if the 
previous settings for time intervals and generalization cause no popular 
paths to exist, it is clearly not a perfect solution. If the trial and error 
method is allowed, decreasing the number of time intervals and generalize 
more products certainly improve the situation. However, it may not be the 
case. In addition, there are no rules for the tuning the settings of the time 
intervals and generalization as the existence of popular paths is heavily 
depending on the instance of the marketplace, which cannot be predicted 
beforehand. Therefore, such tuning lies beyond our scope. 
Nevertheless, if the popular paths are steady, the trial and error 




In this thesis, we propose an algorithm (PISA) that can mine popular 
paths accurately with individuals' privacy protection. In general, a popular 
path indicates a common sequential pattern followed by at least tpp 
individuals. The idea of this algorithm is to allow the individuals to reveal 
crucial information only, which is the information that crucial to identify 
popular paths. In general, crucial information is the records of popular 
items, which are items that owned by at least tpp individuals. Information 
for popular items is public information or can be obtained easily, and no 
privacy is violated by collecting it. In a smart card system, a popular path 
is the common purchase behavior followed by at least tpp customers and a 
popular item is the purchase that made by at least tpp customers. In a 
transportation system, a popular path is one of the most frequently used 
routes that traveled by at least tpp vehicles between any two points in a 
road map and a popular item is the road segment that passed through by at 
least tpp vehicles. By collecting the popular items, the data miner is more 
likely to generate subsequences of the popular paths by SGA. Therefore, it 
is easier to construct the popular paths and so PISA is able to offset the 
decreased accuracy due to privacy protection. 
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This thesis emphasizes on retaining the accuracy when the mining is 
based on limited information. We perform analysis of PISA to investigate 
why the accuracy can be increased. Furthermore, we estimate the 
probabilities of revealing and not revealing subsequences of popular paths 
by the individuals {ProbRevealPop and ProbRevealNonPop). From these 
two probabilities，we calculate the probability for a popular path to be 
identified and then we adjust the extraction threshold value te by this 
probability, where te determines which path is a popular path. In this way, 
the accuracy can be further increased. Simulations are performed to show 
the high accuracy of PISA. 
We also demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can be applied into 
a smart card system and a transportation system. In addition, enhanced 
features such as adding purchase time information into the mined popular 
paths and generalization are added to the smart card system model. The 
former is done by connecting a number of graphs where each graph 
represents the marketplace in each time interval. The latter is done by 
grouping similar purchases so that the data miner can control what 
information is going to mine. 
There are three ways for PISA to preserve privacy. First, non-popular 
items are not revealed, where these items are owned by fewer individuals 
and thus they are more private. Since no individuals reveal non-popular 
items, so the data miner cannot infer the information for any non-popular 
item. Second, there is an upper limit for the amount of revealed 
information. Third, the communications between the individuals and the 
data miner is anonymous. 
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